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Who Cares?
December 25, 1992
The special prosecutor responsible for investigating crimes
committed in the Iran-Contra Affair, Lawrence E. Walsh,
denounced the pardons granted the day before by President George
H.W. Bush. Mr. Walsh charged that "the Iran-contra cover-up,
which has continued for more than six years, has now been
completed."
Walsh said, "evidence of a conspiracy among the highest ranking
Reagan Administration officials to lie to Congress and the
American public" was central to his case against Weinberger.
Pres. Bush had been vice president at the time of the arms sales
to Iran for hostages, and illegal aid to the insurgent Contras
in Nicaragua.
Those Bush pardoned: Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of
Defense, soon to go on trial for lying to Congress; Clair E.
George, the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency's
clandestine services, who had been convicted twice of perjury;
two other CIA officials, Duane Clarridge and Alan D. Fiers Jr.;
Robert C. McFarlane, the former national security adviser, and
Elliott Abrams, the former assistant Secretary of State for
Central America, both of whom had pled guilty to withholding
information from Congress.
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The Iran-Contra
Affair

written by Julie Wolf
Ronald Reagan's efforts to eradicate Communism spanned the
globe, but the insurgent Contras' cause in Nicaragua was
particularly dear to him. Battling the Cuban-backed
Sandinistas, the Contras were, according to Reagan, "the
moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers." Under the
so-called Reagan Doctrine, the CIA trained and assisted this
and other anti-Communist insurgencies worldwide.
Assisting involved supplying financial support, a difficult
task politically after the Democratic sweep of congressional
elections in November 1982. First Democrats passed the
Boland Amendment, which restricted CIA and Department of
Defense operations in Nicaragua specifically; in 1984, a
strengthened Boland Amendment made support almost
impossible. A determined, unyielding Reagan told National
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, "I want you to do
whatever you have to do to help these people keep body and
soul together."
What followed would alter the public's perception of the
president dramatically. How "Iran" and "Contra" came to be
said in the same breath was the result of complicated covert
activities, all carried out, the players said, in the name
of democracy.
In 1985, while Iran and Iraq were at war, Iran made a secret
request to buy weapons from the United States. McFarlane
sought Reagan's approval, in spite of the embargo against
selling arms to Iran. McFarlane explained that the sale of
arms would not only improve U.S. relations with Iran, but
might in turn lead to improved relations with Lebanon,
increasing U.S. influence in the troubled Middle East.
Reagan was driven by a different obsession. He had become
frustrated at his inability to secure the release of the
seven American hostages being held by Iranian terrorists in
Lebanon. As president, Reagan felt that "he had the duty to
bring those Americans home," and he convinced himself that
he was not negotiating with terrorists. While shipping arms
to Iran violated the embargo, dealing with terrorists
violated Reagan's campaign promise never to do so. Reagan
had always been admired for his honesty.
The arms-for-hostages proposal divided the administration.
Longtime policy adversaries Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz opposed the
deal, but Reagan, McFarlane and CIA director William Casey
supported it. With the backing of the president, the plan
progressed. By the time the sales were discovered, more than
1,500 missiles had been shipped to Iran. Three hostages had
been released, only to be replaced with three more, in what
Secretary of State George Shultz called "a hostage bazaar."
When the Lebanese newspaper "Al-Shiraa" printed an exposé on
the clandestine activities in November 1986, Reagan went on
television and vehemently denied that any such operation had
occurred. He retracted the statement a week later, insisting
that the sale of weapons had not been an arms-for-hostages
deal. Despite the fact that Reagan defended the actions by
virtue of their good intentions, his honesty was doubted.
Polls showed that only 14 percent of Americans believed the
president when he said he had not traded arms for hostages.
While probing the question of the arms-for-hostages deal,
Attorney General Edwin Meese discovered that only $12
million of the $30 million the Iranians reportedly paid had
reached government coffers. Then-unknown Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North of the National Security Council explained the
discrepancy: he had been diverting funds from the arms sales
to the Contras, with the full knowledge of National Security
Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and with the unspoken
blessing, he assumed, of President Reagan.
Poindexter resigned, and North was fired, but Iran-Contra
was far from over. The press hounded the president: Did he
know about these illegal activities, and if not, how could
something of this magnitude occur without his knowledge? In
an investigation by the Reagan-appointed Tower Commission,
it was determined that, as president, Reagan's disengagement
from the management of his White House had created
conditions which made possible the diversion of funds to the
Contras. But there was no evidence linking Reagan to the
diversion.
Speculation about the involvement of Reagan, Vice President
George Bush and the administration at large ran rampant.
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh investigated the affair
for the next eight years. Fourteen people were charged with
either operational or "cover-up" crimes. In the end, North's
conviction was overturned on a technicality, and President
Bush issued six pardons, including one to McFarlane, who had
already been convicted, and one to Weinberger before he
stood trial.
Although laws had been broken, and Reagan's image suffered
as a result of Iran-Contra, his popularity rebounded. In
1989 he left office with the highest approval rating of any
president since Franklin Roosevelt.
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